Ken posted a great article about how to configure OWA for ADFS authentication: http://www.theidentityguy.com/articles/2010/10/15/access-owa-with-adfs.html
Archive for the ‘Digital Identity’ Category
Posted by BPuhl on October 15, 2010
Posted by BPuhl on May 5, 2010
Released To Web:
Posted by BPuhl on February 13, 2010
At least let it be a good password: http://www.cxo.eu.com/news/password-protected/
Posted by BPuhl on January 20, 2010
Read an interesting article at http://redtape.msnbc.com/2008/08/almost-everyone.html on the issues/weaknesses of password recovery schemes.
Most everyone remembers when Sara Palin’s Yahoo mail account was hacked, because her password recovery questions were easily discoverable. One thing that I thought was interesting in the article though, was the idea of a “black market” for personal information – let me go buy a profile to find out the name of your dog, your favorite restaurant, etc… How would people come up with this information in the first place, are there secret spies in black trench coats following everyone around taking notes on everything they do? I have no idea…
…in other seemingly unrelated news – has anyone else taken all those funny Facebook quizzes where you answer questions about yourself, and they tell you how long you’re going to live, what your zodiac sign means, and things about your shopping habits and sexuality that you never even realized you knew? There’s got to be a thousand of those things out there… I’m sure glad that Facebook is much safer than the dangerous “internet”!
Posted by BPuhl on December 29, 2009
For a moment though, let’s say that you’ve already sold your management on the benefits of identity federation, and have deployed the infrastructure, and are rockin’ and rollin’ with SSO. It’s time to sit back and relax, comfortable in the knowledge that your users passwords are securely locked inside your directory, so you’re enterprise is “safe” right? Uhmm, maybe not. Go grab your local CISSP and ask them when the enterprise is safe, and they’ll spout a bunch of stuff about risk management, defense in depth, and mitigating controls such as firewalls, virus scanners, and yes – your identity system & passwords. If you dig in though, they often aren’t talking about protecting the “enterprise” – because that’s sort of an ambiguous amalgamation of many things – one of which is “enterprise data”.
Enter the cloud. Do you care about applications moving to the cloud? Absolutely (so does your CxO by the way)! Do you care about how users are getting to that data? Of course, as Patrick, Pamela, and others point out – it’s critical to ensure the identity of your users. But we also have to be concerned about the data that resides in the cloud, and what that means to the rest of the enterprise. Quick illustration:
Cloud Collaboration Vendor: Move your data to my service, and I’ll save you bazillions of dollars over your on-premise suite, plus I’ll give you these value added features like letting your users view their data directly through my service from anywhere (without having to download everything locally), powerful indexing, blah, blah, blah…
CIO: Ok, so let me play back to you what I heard, “I sign here, my users quit complaining about our VPN solution AND you save me bazillions of dollars” – GREAT! Go work with my team and make it so…
CCV: Ok IT guys – your CIO has signed off, now here’s the migration plan: Train your users, copy the data, and…oh yeah – we need the private key that you used to encrypt any of that data so we an index it and decrypt it for your users when they ask…
IT Guy: Como say WHAT?!? That’s the key we use to encrypt ALL of our enterprise data, not just the stuff we’re hosting with you
Does your business require data encryption for some things, like high-business-impact data? If so, how do you reconcile this with pushing the data out to a cloud service? Or do you not? How many instances of your data protection infrastructure do you have (is there more than one key?) Does your vendor support data encryption at all, and if so – do they use their keys or is there a dependency on your service? In my experience, most cloud services are loath to take too many dependencies on customer infrastructure, SLA discussions become big finger-pointing exercises.
Back to data encryption though. The conversation becomes even tougher when you start to talk about the “cross-premise” scenario, which is where you maintain a set of infrastructure on-premise, and host the rest of it in the cloud. I should be able to protect my on-premise data – that a vendor should never have access to anyway – from the vendor, right? Of course I should – so I need to have data protection FOR the vendor, and data protection FROM the vendor.
In this thought exercise, there is an interesting tension about “who” are you protecting the data from. In the on-premise world, the reason you protect data is so outsiders (and even some insiders) can’t get to it. Where on the scale of trusted entities, does your vendor fall? Even if you’ve done your due diligence, and funded new Ferrari’s for an army of lawyers, what data do you give access to? Let’s assume you give your vendor access to all the data that is “relevant to their service”, so the vendor can decrypt any data which is hosted in their site. What’s the process for re-encrypting the data in the case of a breach, either of the on-premise key or of the cloud key? Often times this is a herculean task, which requires knowing/finding all of the encrypted data, and then re-encrypting it with a new key.
If you decide to cancel your contract with a vendor – is that roughly equivalent to a compromise of the key? Everyone I talk to says yes, that somebody with protected content and the ability to decrypt it, who is not authorized to do so – is a security problem. As far as I can see, this is going to need to be something that the lawyers cover, otherwise the off-boarding costs of a vendor skyrocket.
These are just a few, there are a bunch of hard questions when it comes to the cloud – which is what makes this space so much fun! – I don’t have all the answers. Here in MSIT, where we classify and encrypt A LOT of data, we’re having conversations with everyone, business owners, security folks, lawyers. I can’t say we always tread carefully, sometimes we just “go for it”, but when it comes to adopting cloud services, we’re looking hard as we’re taking the next step, and part of that is how we protect our enterprise data IN the cloud, as well as FROM the cloud.
Posted by BPuhl on August 7, 2009
Back in March, I posted EASI ID (pt 1.5), posting a question about who owns the rights to resources within a namespace, specifically email addresses. The reason was to stimulate some braincells, about what could happen if users chose to protect personal content with a digital identity that they thought they owned, but which later they found out the didn’t (in this case their work email address).
Ariel Gordon, one of the rock stars on the Microsoft Identity Strategy team (along with Kim Cameron and others…), recently posted this comment:
Ariel Gordon said
Contoso owns the domain and any identifier in its realm.
Email addresses bear a claim of employment. I.e. my @contoso.com address shows (with a certain level of certainty) that I work for Contoso. Using this address after I leave the company is akin to keeping distributing business cards with the address on it.
Today, 99% websites leverage email providers’ infrastructure for user authentication: you type your email address as a login then create a password that can be reset/resend via email, effectively handing the keys to the account to anyone who controls the mailboxn including the new guy–Jerry Smith in your example.
Websites who implement authentication delegation (aka federation in the consumer sense of the term), could be informed by the IdP of user account deprovisionning and, as best practice, take action to close the account, prompt the user to create alternate credentials (if they have a fallback email address or phone #), etc.
I started to reply with a bit of the backstory in the comments, but figured I’d give this it’s own post, if for no other reason than (I think) it’s a fun look into some of the dynamics of digital identity…not to mention internal politics… So here is my response:
Thanks for replying. Yes, you’re correct, this is exactly what happens, and I agree with you.
The motivation for this post, was a series of conversations that I was in with an internal group here at Microsoft, about who "owned" the @microsoft.com namespace for user identities. Historically, the internal identity management team has owned corp.microsoft.com, but the actual microsoft.com namespace was owned by the team that supports the www.microsoft.com website. However, way back when, somebody in the Live ID team also decided that the microsoft.com namespace was theirs (in the Live ID sense)
It turns out, that today, there are approx. 2.5 million Windows Live ID’s in the @microsoft.com namespace. Obviously we haven’t had that many employees. But back in the day, there was a time when the Live ID team believed that @microsoft.com would be a good namespace for customers to use, similar to @hotmail.com or @live.com. This isn’t really as crazy as it sounds, because it’s analogous to users creating a Yahoo ID in the @yahoo.com namespace.
However many years later though, as we enter the age of federation, the challenge is that Microsoft Corporation uses @microsoft.com as our corporate namespace. In contrast, Yahoo Corporation uses @yahoo-inc.com for their corporate email addresses. So Yahoo can choose to give @yahoo.com to their customers, whereas Microsoft had a conflict.
This was a fun debate at the time, and ultimately we came to the decision that @microsoft.com is our corporate identity. The question though, of what should come to those 2.5 million user ID’s. Fortunately the Live ID team has the solution for this, and added a flag into the federation setup so that a company can choose to “evict on reserve” or “allow merge” of any existing users when they federate.
Allow Merge means that anyone with an existing user account in a namespace that’s federated, will have the option of associating their existing WLID with their new federated ID. In Live ID speak, it means they keep the same PUID. The result is that you keep anything you had access to, but you do so with your new corporate-account-backed, federated Live ID rather than your older, separate username/pw WLID.
Evict on reserve is just what it sounds like, where any user accounts which exist in a namespace when it’s reserved, will be moved into a “forced rename” state. This means that the next time the user logs on with their separate user name and password, they will be forced to change their user name (keeping the same account/PUID) to a different email address, one which is hopefully their personal address.
For Microsoft employees, we chose evict-on-reserve, and are in the process of working through the details of implementation. Our thinking behind this, is that even though they are in the @microsoft.com namespace, any existing accounts are all “personal use” accounts. Therefore, we should protect the personal data, and have a user rename their account to a personal account. When a user logs in with their “new” federated @microsoft.com account, they will be doing “business” work with an account that is backed by their corporate credentials (and which goes away when their employment ends). And yes, we’re working with the Live ID team to get some controls put in place for companies that federate, so that they can limit where corporate backed WLID’s are used.
So that’s where we’re at. Hopefully this gives other folks who are federating something to think about as well, as they integrate with service providers such as Live ID.
I’d love to hear what you, or anyone else thinks about these fun, “moving to the cloud” challenges!
Posted by BPuhl on June 10, 2009
If you use Facebook, you might notice a box when you log in that says beginning June 12th, Facebook will allow registration of user names. If you “click here” to have them send more info, you’ll receive this in your registered email inbox:
Starting on Friday, June 12th, at 9:01pm, you’ll be able to choose a username for your Facebook account to easily direct friends, family, and coworkers to your profile.
To select your username, visit the link below after 9:01pm on June 12th:
To learn more about usernames, visit the Help Center:
The Facebook Team
So what does this mean? Well, for one thing, it means that if you’ve got a common name – or – if your like me, and you KNOW that there’s someone else on Facebook with the same name (since he and I are actually friends on Facebook), then it means that you want to “claim” your user name as soon as the application opens.
I did seen an interesting article here http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-handel/trademark-protection-and_b_213756.html about trademark registrations and how Facebook intends to handle squatters. So don’t bother trying to register facebook.com/McDonalds, you won’t have it for long if you do.
I like the very last part of that article though. There is already a recommendation for what to do, if somebody maliciously claims not only your trademark, but also fills out the forms sufficiently such that you (the legitimate owner of the trademark) actually can’t use the automation to claim it back.
Oh how much fun Identity Management can be
Posted by BPuhl on June 8, 2009
6 months ago – We’re in the process of federating with a new partner, and the link they send us to their federation server looked something like this: https://federation.foo.com:9031/blah – notice the port 9031?
This seemed a little random, but not completely unusual since people tend to grab an available port when they want to host a test/beta site.
With a bit of troubleshooting, working with our proxy server team, etc… figured out that our proxy servers only allow SSL connectivity out to port 443, so the federation was broken. A bit of back and forth with the partner, they moved to the standard SSL port, and everything worked great.
4 months ago – We’re in the process of federating with a new partner, and the link they send us to their federation server looked something like this: https://federation.contoso.com:9031/blah
Us: Hey, we’ve seen this before – we can only connect to port 443 for SSL sites, can you move your federation server to the standard port?
Reply: Sure, done – check it now
And there was much rejoicing. yeah.
Rinse and repeat this a half a dozen times over the past few months, and we’re getting pretty good at recognizing the issue. And since about 60% of our federation partners are using STS’s which are not ADFS/Geneva, this scenario is even more common.
The other day, while dancing this dance yet again, we did notice one thing though – It’s not a random port – it’s ALWAYS port 9031. Not only that, but looking back, it’s always with partners who are using Ping Federate server.
A quick search for “9031” on the Ping website, finds that a lot of their sample code uses port 9031.
Ah ha! Now I get it. It wasn’t random after all, but rather re-using the sample code to set up services. Which is a great, so now we know that when we’re federating with a partner that’s using Ping Federate – be on the lookout for port 9031.
Posted by BPuhl on April 10, 2009
I have had a few discussions recently at work about ways to make things more convenient. Either convenient for our users (cloud services), convenient for our customers (single sign on), etc…
But a one-two punch hit me, when I just had 2 close friends – both of whom have been impacted by the financial mess – have their identity attacked because something that had built in security controls (checks) was made to be more convenient (by phone), and in the process all of the controls were removed so my friends were vulnerable.
Really, I call it fraud, or identity theft, or just plain robbery… But in both cases, the banks say that there are no laws against this:
My friend lost her job, and fell behind on payments. She owed $1100 for this months rent, $4400 to a creditor that by this point had gone to a collection agency, and some other bills (credit cards, gas, electricity, etc…). Through creative budgeting and working with parents, friends, and anyone else, she scraped together $5000 that she could use.
With the new money available, she came up with the following plan:
$1100 for rent
900 for the other bills
500 to the collection agency
The rest to be used for the following months rent, payments, etc…
She called the collection agency, and agreed to pay them $500 now, and then set up a payment plan for the rest of the money. That’s where the first mistake happened: They wanted the payment as a “check by phone”. So she voided a check, gave them the info, etc…
The collection agency first attempted to clear the check for the full $4400. Because the money was in the account, the check cleared – of course, this meant that she couldn’t pay any of the other bills, or her rent, etc… And she had already tapped out her friends, parents, etc…
You can imagine that the calls to the collection agency were like: “Sorry, sucks to be you – we’ve got our money now”
The bank was equally useless: “You gave them a check by phone, the money was in the account, they cleared it…Sucks to be you”
This was just completely ridiculous, but it shows that in the absence of standards or protocols, there is no shortage of people that will offer things for the sake of “convenience” which blow the hell out of “security”. If you have to write a check and sign it, then you fill in the amount, etc… modification of that is check fraud. But those security controls went out the window when banks allowed people to do “checks by phone”, and there is absolutely nothing to prevent unscrupulous people from raping your bank account if you give them the information.
The second case is similar, but with a slight twist
My friend has slowly but surely been paying off debts that were racked up over a period of time, and has been working through one of those debt consolidation management companies. Since she wasn’t getting the resolution that she needed from the company, she took back the money that was in their escrow account and started working with the collection agency independently.
On the first phone call, she had an $7,000 debt and worked with the agency to negotiate down to where they would accept $4300. Seems like a good deal, so again, check by phone for $4300.
A couple of days later, she received a notice from the collection agency, indicating that they “Had an agreement for an initial payment of $4300”. In other words, the deal they made on the phone was a lie, instead of negotiating the total, they just wanted an initial payment and were going to keep going after her for the remaining balance.
Ahhh…but the check by phone hadn’t cleared yet.
So a quick call to the bank, a $28.00 stop payment charge, and there was a stop-payment for that check before it cleared.
Not so much. 2 days later, $4300 was withdrawn from the account anyway, by check #1001 (not the check number she gave them). A long, convoluted, multi-transfer call back with the bank this time, and they could see where the initial check number had attempted to clear, been rejected (the stop payment), and then the company had re-submitted another check by phone with the different check number and got the money.
After several days of arguing, it’s still unclear whether the bank is going to say “Sorry, sux to be you” or if they are actually going to help. I’m not holding my breath.
So again, the safety features around checks – being numbered, signed, amounts written (twice) – are all placed into the trusting hands of the least trustworthy person (the merchant that wants your money), and there is remarkably little recourse. I suppose you could go get a lawyer, etc… But during that time the money is gone, life still needs to be lived, and a lawyer is going to take 30% of whatever you get back anyway (or some amount of payment)…
All for the sake of convenience (to whom?)
There are better ways, one of which I really like. I’ve had a credit card with CitiBank since college. And many years ago, they came up with this idea of virtual account numbers for your credit card. You can go to their website (or they have a downloadable application), and if you want to make a purchase, you can get a one-time use credit card number (with expiration and CVC) for that one purchase. I haven’t used it in a while, but IIRC you can even specify the amount of the purchase you’re going to make (which is really the protection). This is great, because the security of a credit card is handing the piece of plastic with the signature on the back to the person behind the register. With online purchases, you can’t do that, so instead lets take the things which you can control (amount of purchase, usefulness of the number after it’s been used properly) and control those instead. Reasonable mitigations.
This is the type of control that we’re going to need if we want to protect our resources in a more “convenient” (read: Online) world.
Posted by BPuhl on March 27, 2009
There were many great speakers at TEC 2009 this year (and I was there too!), especially in the Federated Identity track. One of the things that I was interesting, was during one of the sessions the speaker described many of the current non-federated authentication schemes that SaaS providers can use. The implementations may have varied slightly, but they often amounted to “Give us your user name and password, and we’ll authenticate you across some out-of-band channel.” The deployment of this service requires that extra channel for auth, sometimes being a VPN connection, or an LDAP service that the provider can authenticate against…things like that.
A comment was made, something about the security risk that this poses; after all, it IS by definition a “man in the middle attack.” The next couple of minutes were spent blasting this type of ridiculous design (after all, this was the federation track) and how horrible this was and people would never let this type of set up occur at their company.
Of course, that’s probably not true at all, is it? After all, every application outsourcing project I’ve worked on includes the “user SSO” line item, but nobody says what that has to be. And the corporate security risk analysis has to outweigh the hard dollar cost savings that were driving the project to begin with, which is why I suspect that the typical CorpSec risk analysis always ends up somewhere in the Billions of dollars with a picture of the company going down in flames. Yet even that’s not enough even enough to stop the project from moving forward, because at the end of the day, IT departments are often not empowered to say “No, you can’t do that”…rather…we end up saying, “This sucks, but here’s the best that we can do to make it work.”
And that is why, a man in the middle attack, even one with credential harvesting, is OK if the company is paying someone to do it (and saving real money in the process)
And it’s why now more than ever we need comprehensive federated authentication solutions, so we don’t have to get run over by these hacks.